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PEOPLE v. DUNN 
[46 C.2d 639; 297 P.2d 9641 
A. 23936. In Bank. June 6, 
Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Values.-Where it on 
cross-examination that a witness' as to value 
is based on it may be stricken from 
the record. 
Eminent Domain-Value of Land Taken-Profits.-Evidenee 
of derived from a business conducted on land sought to 
be condemned is too speculative, uncertain and remote to be 
considered as a basis for ascertaining market value. 
Id.-Value of Land Taken-Rental Value.-Generally, income 
from property in the way of rents is a proper element to be 
considered in arriving at the measure of compensation to be 
paid for the taking of property. 
Id.-Proceedings-Evidence.-In an action to condemn land 
for highway purposes, the trial court erred in striking testi-
mony of the owners' witness with to a lease and to a 
so-called bonus value of the lease. 
Id.- Proceedings- Appeal- Reversible Error.- The trial 
court's error in rejecting evidence concerning a lease on a 
parcel sought to be condemned was prejudicial where the evi-
dence with respect to whether the lease was made in good 
faith was conflicting, and where the jury was precluded by 
instructions from considering the lease as a factor in fixing 
the value of the property. 
Id.-Value of Property Taken-Prospective Uses.-Where land 
sought to be condemned is not presently available :f'or a par-
ticular use by reason of a zoning ordinance or other restric-
tion imposed by law, but the tends to show a "reason~ 
able probability" of a change in the near :future, the effect of 
such probability on the minds of' purchasers generally may 
be taken into consideration in fixing present market value. 
See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 370; Am.Jnr., Evidence, § 890 
et seq. 
Income. as an element in determining value of' property taken 
in eminent domain, note, 65 A.L.R. 455. See also Oal.Jur.2d, 
!!innwmt. Domain, § 72 et seq.; Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, § 344. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence, §.530(3); [2] Eminent 
Domain, § 82; [3]· E.minent Domain, § 81; [4] Eminent Domain, 
; [5] Eminent Domain, § 182; [6] Eminent Domain, § 69(7). 
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of the Superior Court of San 
,f1H1ge. Affirnwd in part and 
Action to condemn two parcels of land for highway pur-
poses. ,Judgment for plaintiff affirmed as to one parcel and 
to other parcel. 
,James A. Moore and George A. \Vefltover for Appellants. 
C. R B. Pegram, Herbert J. Williams, 
Albert J. Day and Joseph A. Montoya for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Defendant owners have appealed from 
a judgment condemning two parcels of land for highway 
purposes. Parcel 1 consisted of several lots at the end of 
an unimproved block owned by defendants, and Parcel 2 
consisted of two lots separated from Parcel 1 by an inter-
vening street. The owners commenced construction of a 
garage on Parcel 2 about August 1, 1953, and assertedly 
spent some $12,000 on the building prior to commencement 
of this action. On August 19 the Highway Commission 
adopted a resolution determining that public interest and 
necessity required the condemnation of the two parcels, and 
on August 25 this action was brought. 
'l'he People and the owners each produced two expert 
witnesses who gave conflicting opinions as to damages. With 
reference to Parcel 1, the estimates of value ran from $8,340 
to $32,000, tlH• severance damage from nil to $4,000, and 
the benefit to the remainder of the property from nil to 
$5,000. As to Parcel 2, the values ranged from $15,000 to 
$46,550. The jury, which viewed the premises, found that 
the value of Parcel 1 was $11,000, the severance damage 
was $500, and the special benefit to the remainder was $2,000, 
and that the value of Parcel 2 was $15,000. Judgment was 
thereafter entered awarding $11,000 for Parcel 1 and $15,000 
for Parcel 2. 
The principal question is whether the court erred in re-
jecting evidence concerning a lease on Parcel 2. The lease, 
dated July 31, 1953, was for a term of 25 years, and it pro-
vided that the owners should construct a building for garage 
purposes and that the lessees should pay any increase in 
real property taxes after the first levy against the improve-
ments. The lease 1vaR first mentioned during the direct exami-
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for the "bonus value" of the lease. 
~£r<uH.eu a motion to strike the valuation tes.tm1on.v 
and instructed witness Har-
testified among other in substance that 
value of Parcel Number 2, he took into con-
a so-called bonus of $15,000 on a on 
~"'''"""wh. Yon will all of the of 
as to that lease to the same extent 
never heard it." when 
ue~>v.HJ•u asked on the direct examination of 
of the the court ruled that, by analogy to cases 
that evidence of the net profit from property is not 
the lease would not be received in evidence. 
·where it appears on cross-examination that the wit-
v. 
as to market value is based upon improper 
it may be stricken from the record. ( Oity 
96 Cal.App. 708, 716, 722 [248 
of neu,wvnu 
[59 P.2d 
15 Cal.App.2d 184, 
19 Cal.2d 713, 
744 P.2d .) 
It is settled that evidence of profits from a 
conducted on the land is too speculative, uncertain 
remote to be considered as a basis for ascertaining 
value. (Stoekton & OopperopoUs R. Oo. v. Galgiani, 
139 ; de Freitas v. Town of Suisun Oity, 
265-266 [149 P. [agricultural land}; 
v. Deaeon, 119 Cal.App. 491, 494 [7 
fi"''"''""l ; 7 A.L.R. 163, 164; 16 A.L.R.2d 
On the other hand, it is the general rule that 
from in the way of rents is a proper element 
at the measure of compensation 
for the of property. (See 1 Orgel on 
under Eminent Domain (2d ed., 1953), pp. 703-
708-712; 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed., 1952), 
215-219; J ahr, Law of Eminent Domain (1953), 
"'"'" .. "'"""; 18 Am.Jur. § p. 988; 65 A.L.R. 455; 16 
;.u •. ll;.:::;u 1113.) [ 4] The court erred in striking the evidence 
642 PEOPLE 1!. DUNN [46 0.2d 
the j nry to all his 
to the lease. 
[5] that the error was not prejudicial because 
the essential terms of the lease were before the jury and 
because there was evidence that the lease was entered into 
for the purpose of increasing the amount of the award. The 
evidence with respect to whether the lease was made in good 
faith was conflicting, and the jury was not instructed on 
the Although plaintiff's witnesses gave some testi-
mony concerning the terms of the lease, the jury was pre-
cluded by the instructions from considering the lease as a 
factor in fixing the value of the property. We are satisfied 
that, in view of the entire record, the error was prejudicial. 
As to Parcel 1 it is contended that, in fixing the amount 
of severance damages, it was error to admit evidence of the 
probability of a change of zoning of the remainder of the 
block from which Parcel 1 was taken. [6] Where the land 
is not presently available for a particular use by reason of 
a zoning ordinance or other restriction imposed by law, but 
the evidence tends to show a ''reasonable probability'' of a 
change in the near future, the effect of such probability upon 
the minds of purchasers generally may be taken into con-
sideration in fixing present market value. (Long Beach City 
H. S. Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Oal.2d 763, 768-769 [185 P.2d 585, 
173 A.L.R. 249], quoting with approval from 1 Nichols on 
Eminent Domain (2d ed.) § 219, p. 669.) Here the People's 
experts testified that they had made investigations and that 
as a result they were of the opinion that a change of zoning 
was reasonably or highly probable. There was no error in 
the admission of such testimony. 
The judgment is affirmed as to Parcel 1 and reversed 
as to Parcel 2. 
Traynor, J., Spence, J., and MeOomb, ,J., coneurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in 
the judgment of reversal as to Parcel 2, but dissent from 
the judgment of affirmance as to Parcel 1. In my opinion 
nothing could be more speculative than prospective action 
of a zoning authority. It is as changeable as the political 
fortunes of its members. The admission of such evidence was 
prejudicially erroneous. 
I am still in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Jus-
tice Schauer in his dissenting opinion in Long Beach City 
PEOPLE v. DUNN 643 
[ 46 C.2d 539; 297 P.2d 964 I 
Dist. v. 30 Cal.2d 763, 775 
249], that evidence of the adaptability and 
for all useful purposes, regardless of the purpose 
it is presently zoned, is admissible in an eminent 
proceeding. 
therefore reverse the whole 
coneurred. 
Concurring and concur in the 
affirmance of the judgment as to Parcel 1 but I dissent from 
the reversal of the judgment as to Parcel 2. that 
it error to instruct the jury to disregard the 
of witness Harrington's testimony concerning the importance 
of lease in determining market value, the error did not 
result in a miscarriage of justice. The terms of the lease were 
described by other witnesses and therefore they were 
before the jury. 
Furthermore, the record indicates that the lease was made 
for the purpose of extracting an award in excess of the 
true market value of the parcel, and that it in fact had no 
proper bearing on true market value. It is conceded that 
the lease was executed only 26 days before the condemnation 
proceeding was brought and only 20 days before the High-
way Commission adopted a resolution determining that public 
interest and necessity required the condemnation of the par-
cels. ·witnesses for both sides agreed that at the time the 
lease was entered into it was common knowledge that the 
state was planning to make improvements on the parcels 
and that their acquisition was necessary to the project. 'rhe 
record also discloses substantial evidence that four or five 
months before the lease was entered into the state gave 
written notice to both the planning commission and the city 
eonncil of the city in which Parcel 2 was situated that it 
intended to ae(]nire the land; that the state's intention to 
Parcel 2 was a matter of common knowledge well 
before the lease was entered into and the construction of the 
garage was begun; that at the request of the defendant the 
zone location of Parcel 2 was changed from residential to 
commercial after the state's intention to acquire the parcel 
had become commonly known; that the construction on thn 
continued to the vct·y clay when the condemnation 
action was filed despite the fact that it was known brfore 
that time that the :-;tate iutendrt1 to arc1nire the parcel; that 
644 Lr?':DBERG l'. CouxTY OF ArunmnA [46 C.2d 
the that the lessees' business would succeed were 
poor credit and that 
rent was out of to the value 
aml to the amount of bnsiness the lessees could 
to carry on. Under the 
the exclusion of 
uneonseionable tactics. 
F. No. 19026. In Bank. June 6, 
~\LPHED .J. Ll'~DBEJW, Respondc>nt, v. C01T~TY OF 
ALAMEDA et al., Defendants and Appellants; 'l'HE 
ROl\IAN CATHOLIC \\'I1JhF'AHE COHPORATION OF 
SAN PRANCISCO Corporation), Intervener and 
Appellant. 
[1] Taxation-Remedies of Taxpa.yer.-Actions by a taxpayer to 
challenge the legality of a tax exemption are authorized by 
Code Civ. Proc., § 526a, and, being in aid of the collection of 
taxes, are distinguishable from cases in which a party seeking 
[8] 
to avoid taxation is denied mandamus on the ground that an [9] 
action for refund of illegally collected taxes constitutes 
an adequate remedy. 
[2] !d.-Subjects of Taxation.-All property must be taxed unless 
an exemption is authorized by the state Constitution or granted 
by the laws of the United States. 
[3] Charities-Definition.-The word "charity" may be defined as 
a gift to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the 
benefit of an indefinite number of persons-either by bringing 
their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by [10] 
relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by 
assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or 
maintaining buildings or works or otherwise lessening the 
burdens of government. [11] 
See Cal.Jur., Taxation, §56. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, ~ 265; Taxation, § 39; 
[3] Charities, § 1; [ 4] Charities, § 18; 'raxation, § 69; [6, 9, 
12, Taxation, § 78; 8] Taxation, ~ 68; DOJ Constitutional 
Law, 59; [11] Constitutional Law, § 35. 
*Reportm· 's Note: Respondent Lundborg died after filing of this 
decision and Paul W. Hersey as Special Administrator was substituted 
in his place. 
[5] 
§ 524. 
[10 
tiona] 
